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Democracy and public space have been inextricably linked since the agora of Ancient Greece. In 
modern times, spaces such as Tahrir Square and Zuccotti Park have been brought to the forefront 
of global media as the stages upon which their respective societies fight against their perceived 
oppression. In September 2014, the students of Hong Kong began protesting in Tamar Park at 
the Central Government Complex in Admiralty after it was determined their “free elections” 
would be chosen from a panel of candidates decided by China’s communist party. In the 
following weeks, the protest expanded to many other demographics and three occupied sites 
within the city-state, each with their own identity and narrative.  
In my thesis, I will examine the role of architecture and space in the Umbrella Movement at 
Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok from three distances. First, I will look at the historical 
context of the spaces and their geographical network within the city. Then I will look at the 
urban context of each space, the protest’s relationship with their audience, and the consequences 
of Hong Kong’s very limited and unique public spaces. Finally, I will analyze specific spatial 
strategies employed by protesters and police in efforts to manipulate space in their favor. As a 
critique of marxist Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the “right to the city”, my analysis will look at 
space as an extension of economy, but also as a dynamic symbol of democracy, revealing the 
gravity of oppression and the conviction of the oppressed.  
THE DESIGN OF DISSENT: PROTEST AND URBAN SPACE IN HONG KONG’S 
UMBRELLA MOVEMENT 
 
Paige Anderson, B. Philosophy 
University of Pittsburgh, 2016
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION: A FESTERING IDEA ............................................................... 1 
2.0 CAUGHT IN THE WEB: THE GEOGRAPHIES OF PROTEST ....................... 15 
2.1 HONG KONG’S HISTORICAL IDENTITY ................................................. 16 
2.2 BORDERS .......................................................................................................... 18 
2.3 HONG KONG ISLAND .................................................................................... 21 
2.4 MONG KOK ...................................................................................................... 25 
2.5 A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE SHIFT .................................................... 30 
3.0 LOOK AT ME NOW: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIENCE AND 
SPACE 33 
3.1 ADMIRALTY’S AUDIENCE .......................................................................... 35 
3.2 THE ROLE OF IMAGE ................................................................................... 37 
3.3 CAPITALISM AND CAUSEWAY BAY ........................................................ 40 
3.4 SPACE AS TESTAMENT ................................................................................ 47 
4.0 AN ARCHITECTURAL BATTLEFRONT: STRATEGIES OF SPATIAL 
SUBVERSION............................................................................................................................. 49 
4.1 THE PROTESTS AS A REACTION .............................................................. 51 
4.2 BARRIERS ......................................................................................................... 53 
4.3 SPATIAL TACTICS AND STRATEGIES ..................................................... 57 
 vi 
4.4 MONUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY ................................................................ 65 
5.0 CONCLUSION: REMNANTS ................................................................................. 70 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 75 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Tamar Park in Admiralty, Hong Kong, photo by author ................................................. 1 
Figure 2. The Central Government Complex Building, photo by author ....................................... 2 
Figure 3. The Geography of Hong Kong, map by author ............................................................... 3 
Figure 4. The regions previously inhabitated by British military, map by author. ....................... 25 
Figure 5. Langham Place in Mong Kok, diagram by author ........................................................ 27 
Figure 6. The axes of Hong Kong and the three protest sites within Hong Kong’s geography, 
diagram by author ......................................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 7. View from the stage in Tamar Park, photo by author ................................................... 34 
Figure 8. The Civic Square under part of the Central Government Complex, photo by author ... 36 
Figure 9. Protester and victim of the polices’ teargas. Photo credit: FX Pasquier ....................... 39 
Figure 10. Times Square intersection in Causeway Bay, photo by author ................................... 42 
Figure 11. Diagram depicting views of the Causeway Bay protest site from the surrounding 
skyscrapers, diagram by author ..................................................................................................... 44 
Figure 12. Point A on Figure 11. View of the former Causeway Bay protest site from a nearby 
shopping mall, photo by author .................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 13. Admiralty’s iconic skyline, photo and diagram by author .......................................... 51 
 viii 
Figure 14. Protesters zip-tying temporary fencing together in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: FX 
Pasquier ......................................................................................................................................... 55 
Figure 15. Diagram of the Admiralty protest site emphasizing the barrers constructed by the 
protesters, diagram by author. ....................................................................................................... 56 
Figure 16. Umbrella Movement leader giving a speech while using the footbridges of Admiralty 
as a mezzanine, 2014. Photo credit: FX Pasquier ......................................................................... 58 
Figure 17.Footbridges in Admiralty decorated in banners, 2014. Photo credit: Wing1990hk ..... 60 
Figure 18. Recently constructed footbridge in Admiralty. Summer, 2015, photo by author. ...... 61 
Figure 19. Harcourt Road in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung ............................. 63 
Figure 20. The Umbrella Man in Admiralty, 2015. Photo credit: Citobun .................................. 64 
Figure 21. Protesters using umbrellas as shields from the police and later, tear gas, 2014. Photo 
credit: FX Pasquier ....................................................................................................................... 65 
Figure 22. Umbrella art in Causeway Bay, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung ......................... 66 
Figure 23. Umbrella art in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung................................. 67 
Figure 24. March in Causeway Bay, Summer 2015, photo by author .......................................... 67 
Figure 25. A daunting farewell from some protesters in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Melanie 
Ko .................................................................................................................................................. 72 
 
 ix 
 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION: A FESTERING IDEA 
 
           Figure 1. Tamar Park in Admiralty, Hong Kong, photo by author. 
Nestled within the financial district of one of the world’s densest cities sits a small, grassy park. 
It is pie-shaped such that it wedges itself beneath a large government building designed as a 
squared arch with the green space running beneath (see Figures 1 and 2). At the Southern point, 
escalators connect it to the sidewalk and the five-lane street below. The larger end of the park 
overlooks Hong Kong’s bustling harbor. There are many paths, benches and a small concrete 
stage. On September 22, 2014, student activists and academics gathered in Tamar Park during a 
class boycott opposing government censorship of educational material and the recently decreed 
election terms that many thought violated the principle of “one person, one vote”.1 Student 
leaders and activists gave speeches on the stage. Dwarfed by the looming Central Government 
Complex, they begged the politicians inside to listen. A week went on without any reaction as 
                                                 
1 “Umbrella Revolution Timeline.” 
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the park’s population climbed from a few hundred to a few thousand. Unsatisfied, the protesters 
marched to Hong Kong’s highest ranked political official’s home, Chief Executive CY Leung.2 
Ignored once more, they returned to Tamar Park to find the space overtaken by a pro-China rally. 
Their interactions with the new occupants of the park led most to believe that the pro-Chinese 
demonstrators primarily consisted of actors presumably paid by the state.3  Instead of leaving, 
the original protesters moved to the street on the Complex’s Eastern edge. Unassumingly and 
organically, the Umbrella Movement had been born. 4 
 
             Figure 2. The Central Government Complex Building, photo by author. 
 In this moment of protest, the three spatial choices for protest sites represented the 
concerns of the protesters. Each of the spaces demonstrated a different interpretation of the 
protesters’ “right to the city”, and in doing so, exposed the extent of Hongkongers’ oppression 
                                                 
2 Tse, Riots, Unrest, and the Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong Rising. 
3 Ibid; Pasquier, Admiralty and the Umbrella Movement. 
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under the Beijing government, as well as the potential of the protesters’ collective power. In this 
thesis, I am relying on a foundation of Marxist geographers, but also using this analysis of the 
Umbrella Movement to critique Marxist framework’s top-down interpretation of the urban 
environment, which undermines the potential of subversion and counter-production of space.  
In my thesis, I argue that the protesters’ strategic, subversive actions upon urban space 
affirm their right to the city and the subsequent reactions to these actions act as testament to the 
injustices they were proclaiming. The Umbrella Movement addressed concerns of access, 
legitimacy and the power of the collective masses at the local level, and in doing so, created 
ripples expanding into global, urban institutions of power. 
 I am investigating the Umbrella Movement and its three protest sites, Admiralty, Mong 
Kok and Causeway Bay, through a lens of geography, urban space and architecture. I want my 
interpretation of the movement to emerge from understanding the perspective of its creators and 
the impact within Hong Kong, so my analysis does not derive from the gaze of an omniscient, 
removed commentator. Instead, I have analyzed the spaces from the three scales that a protester 
within urban space would perceive it: as a point in the city-state’s geography, within a certain 
neighborhood, and finally, as an intervention upon a specific street. The protesters affirmed their 
presence at all three of these scales, so in recognizing these spaces as the protesters do, as 
important, complex fortresses symbolizing their rights, I can better understand the implications 
of the actions within them.  
My ideas draw upon a theoretical framework informed by Marxist geography, which 
applies Marxist ideas to the infrastructure and design of urban space. Marxist geography exists 
with the understanding that the city is not just a place where people live, but composed of urban 
infrastructure designed for and by institutions of capitalism. The construction of the city is 
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funded by surplus extracted from the working class by the elite, upper class, who then create 
urban space so that the city becomes an engine with which to further extract profits. It is rooted 
in Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s concept of “the right to the city”, which describes the 
working class’ right to access urban resources. It has been expounded upon by the likes of David 
Harvey, Manuel Castells and Andy Merrifield, who attempt to redefine the concept for the 
modern age. This thesis uses the Umbrella Movement as a case-study, offering a real example to 
critique these theoretical concepts and offer insight to the modern application and interpretation 
of the right to the city.  
 Although my interpretation of the Umbrella Movement and its implications is much more 
spatially intimate, it is imperative to situate the foundations of the movement within the context 
of three larger geopolitical networks. The narrowest of them is the Hong Kong city-state. Ackbar 
Abbas asserts that in the 1970s Hongkongers began to recognize their own unique cultural 
identity, separate from both China and Great Britain, the latter of which had been the colonial 
power of the territory since 1842.5 The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration Act in 1984, 
which established a transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty back to China in 1997, brought the 
dichotomy of British and Chinese cultural influence to the foreground. As part of the 1984 Act, 
Hongkongers were ensured fifty years of political autonomy, including the democratic election 
of their representatives. However, the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and their violent 
end, just five years after the signing, signified a clear distinction between the authority of China 
and of Great Britain. Hongkongers expressed their solidarity with the protesters in Beijing with 
their own protests, which involved nearly 18% of Hong Kong’s population gathering at Hong 
                                                 
5 Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and Politics of Disappearance. 
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Kong’s then embassy of mainland China.6 Hongkongers began to recognize Beijing as a threat to 
their budding identity and political autonomy. Consequently, an emphasis was placed on 
decidedly un-Chinese components of their culture, like their freedom of speech and press, and 
their democratic rights. In 1986, over a thousand protesters occupied a Hong Kong theatre 
demanding direct elections of the city’s legislature; it was the city’s first significant protest 
revolving around elections and Beijing responded by providing Hong Kong with eighteen 
directly elected representatives.7  Many more instances of protest, including hunger strikes, 
rallies and petitions followed so that by the time of the handover on July 1, 1997, protest had 
become a distinctive aspect of Hongkonger’s cultural identity. The eminent date of July 1st 
emerged as a national holiday upon which Hong Kong citizens rallied as a demonstration of their 
freedom of speech, democracy, and the rights of minorities.8 Tensions between Hongkongers 
and the Beijing-based government reached a climax when Basic Law Article 23 was passed in 
2002, prohibiting “any act of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the Central 
People's Government”.9 The largest July 1st rally yet followed in 2003. It was a cry for universal 
suffrage and freedom of expression. In hindsight, it could be argued that these annual protests 
acted as an incubator for the Umbrella Movement, which would emerge eleven years later.  
 Additionally, in the major cause of establishing autonomy, the geopolitical border 
between mainland China and Hong Kong’s Kowloon Peninsula needed to be re-established in a 
cultural and political sense. When Hong Kong was given to Britain, it was barren land, and the 
                                                 
6 Wark, Virtual Geography. 114. 
7 Kuo, “A Brief History of Hong Kong’s 30-Year Fight for Democracy.” 
8 Shiu-hing, “Decolinization and Political Development in Hong Kong.” 
9 “Basic Law Full Text.” 
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city was established under remote leadership. Even during its brief occupation by Japan, there 
was still a geographic distance between the city and its authority. Since 1997, the geographic 
position of Hong Kong as being annexed to China via the Kowloon Peninsula very literally 
heightened the threat on Hongkongers’ way of life and placed an important symbolic 
significance on the border between Hong Kong’s Kowloon Peninsula and mainland China. 
 The second of these geopolitical networks is the East Asian region. Taiwan and 
Singapore also have historically contentious relationships with China. In fact, many saw the 
establishment of “one country, two systems” relationship between China and Hong Kong as a 
method for the former to lure Taiwan into re-joining the People’s Republic of China.10 Surely, 
the Umbrella Movement convinced the Taiwanese otherwise, but this is an example of the strong 
sense of regional identity in Eastern Asia. Taiwan and Hong Kong certainly have a distinct 
empathy for one another’s politics and many Hongkongers regard Taiwan as the regional 
precedent of freedom of speech and press.11 The region is also connected by an economic thread. 
The “Four Asian Tigers”, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, are known for their 
powerful, free-market economies.12 Hong Kong is the only of these four regions without political 
autonomy. Like Hong Kong, Singapore is a city-state and was a British colony until 1955, 
though protests are almost nonexistent due to an authoritarian government. In Taiwan, concerns 
regarding the effects of unbridled capitalism and collusion between government and business, 
similar to some of the concerns of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, resulted in many protests, 
including the Sunflower Movement of 2013. In recent history, social media has made the 
                                                 
10 Moser and Kuo, Hong Kong Protests and Suicide. 
11 Anonymous, The Umbrella Movement: Social Media and Public Space in Hong Kong. 
12 Schenk, “Economic History of Hong Kong.” 
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relationship between Taiwan and Hong Kong even stronger.13 Blogs and social media websites 
transmit images, like a widely-circulated photo of a protester’s bloodied face mask in Mong Kok 
during the Umbrella Movement, that attest to protester abuse and promote their beliefs.14 
Following the Umbrella Movement, the many commonalities between Hongkongers and the 
Taiwanese people, including their Chinese ethnicity and fraught connections to mainland China, 
are brought to the forefront.  
 That leads me to the largest geopolitical network: the global, virtual network of humans 
seeking civil liberties, representation, and a voice. Preceded by the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
Movement, which began in the US but spread across the world, the virtual geography of dissent 
had become a phenomenon with focal points throughout many geographic regions. Geographer 
Mackenzie Wark describes modern people as lacking cultural origins and proposed that we 
instead have terminals - momentary localities throughout a global, urban network.15 Social 
media, however, can emphasize the sensation of place and transport humans back to their origins 
with images and rhetoric that unite them as a culture and a people. For instance, during the 
Umbrella Movement, Hongkongers abroad could participate in the protests virtually. Some 
translated blog posts and disseminated images, while others were even convinced to return home 
to occupy space.16 Broadly, these virtual networks allowed the Umbrella Movement to connect 
to a larger narrative of civil liberties, providing unparalleled global empathy. Social media has 
                                                 
13 Anonymous, The Umbrella Movement: Social Media and Public Space in Hong Kong. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Wark, Virtual Geography. XIV. 
16 Anonymous, The Umbrella Movement: Social Media and Public Space in Hong Kong. 
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championed a modern form of cosmopolitanism that suggests injustices upon any protesters are 
furthermore abuse of an international community of activists. 
 Marxist geographer Manuel Castells has chronicled the influence of social networks 
within geopolitical atmospheres previous to 2012 and stated that their power comes from their 
ability to circumvent existing networks of power, which often represent powerful elites, to 
establish “the networks that are”.17 These networks “that are” are both global and local. While 
the global is the modern phenomenon that has unlocked seemingly endless potential for 
spreading ideas, the local is the scale at which these ideas can truly transform into change. In 
urban societies, space is a precious commodity with universal demand, regardless of socio-
economic class. In 2014, Hongkongers could express solidarity towards the universal ideas of the 
Occupy Movement and draw inspiration from the powerful precedent of the Arab Spring, but 
their injustices could not be adequately acknowledged or even begun to be solved without 
addressing specific issues and a specific audience. The specifics of these demands could only be 
manifested in the particular localities of their urban space.  
 Placing the Umbrella Movement within the global context of contemporary protests 
could suggest that it is merely a more recent, Asian interpretation of the Occupy Movement. 
After all, one of the original names of the movement was “Occupy Central With Love and 
Peace”. However, that would be to overlook the specific injustices the Hongkongers were 
protesting. Their message is culturally and geographically unique to Hong Kong, and was 
represented in the nuances of the protesters’ spatial strategies. Some have speculated that the 
Occupy Movement failed to reach its full potential because it did not foster a single, unified 
                                                 
17 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope. 9. 
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demand.18 While there was a certain genius behind the branding of Occupy that aroused protests 
in nearly a thousand cities, Occupy’s ambiguity was perhaps its demise if the goal was to bring 
about specific changes to policy or leadership. There is a lot of evidence that the ideas of the 
“99%” linger today, but the protest’s momentum within localities has not lasted as long as many 
protesters hoped. Most cities did not establish unique demands for their unique political 
circumstances; rather, the Occupy Movement’s demands broadened with time to foster a larger 
demographic group and establish a clear majority.19 This is proven when individual protest sites 
are studied. Almost always, Occupy protesters in the United States mimicked Zucotti Park, the 
original protest in New York City, by occupying a public square or park near a financial district. 
Although this encouraged the universal message and afforded the Occupy Movement global 
publicity, their outrage was watered down by a common spatial typology that seemed 
disconnected from the protesters’ specific, local concerns. The Umbrella Movement advanced 
the notions of Occupy by creating a dynamic and multi-faceted protest that capitalized on the 
power of space. In chapter one, I examine how the protesters interpreted their geography and 
used the protest to reinforce their border with China and encourage the unity of Hong Kong’s 
citizens. In chapter two, I look at the protests locally. Within each district, they addressed their 
oppressors directly and aggressively by assuming responsibility of the public spaces around 
them. In my final chapter, I discuss the details of the protest spaces themselves and the 
protesters’ strategies to reinvent public space so it represented their ideals with symbolic 
interventions and inclusive architectural design. These three scales of interpretation illustrate the 
clear proclamation of the protesters’ right to the Hong Kong city. 
                                                 
18 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope.159-219. 
19 Ibid. 
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 Marxist geography provides an invaluable platform for this analysis. David Harvey’s 
recent book Rebel Cities emphasizes the power accumulated by capitalists with monopoly rent, a 
concept that applies to Hong Kong more than maybe any other place in the world. Unique policy 
regarding real estate and the acute demand for it, due to the topography of Hong Kong and its 
important international position, makes Harvey’s analysis especially pertinent to Hong Kong and 
I’ve benefitted from his perspective greatly, particularly in understanding the protesters’ 
audience (in chapter 2). However, like many Marxist geographers, Harvey looks at urban space 
as an abstraction of capitalist power and falls short of recognizing the average citizen’s reality - 
particularly the potential of their manifested power during a time of protest. Additionally, I was 
influenced by Manuel Castells’ Networks of Outrage and Hope, which analyzes the power of 
social media to work around institutions of power. He discusses social media’s capacity to bring 
together the outraged so that they can foster hope while acknowledging the importance of urban 
space and the many ways it becomes intertwined with social media during a time of protest, but 
does little to elaborate on the implications of these spaces before, after and without social 
media’s influence. In his most famous book, The Urban Question, Castells criticizes Lefebvre’s 
ideas because he does not commit to the elusive idea of the “urban” and its inhabitants, and 
instead relies on the security of form (also known as the physical city) to negotiate the 
implications of capitalism.20 Andy Merrifield modernizes these concerns with his interpretation 
of the right to the city. He asserts that the city, in modern times, is no longer a viable foundation 
for interpreting capitalist power because current city centers are merely focal points atop a global 
urban fabric.21 Globalization has redefined capitalism, trade, connectivity, and the “working 
                                                 
20 Merrifield, The Politics of the Encounter. 27. 
21 Ibid. 
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class” since Lefebvre’s time, so Merrifield perceives urban protest as foremost a global 
endeavor. Within the global, contemporary timeline of urban protest, it is undeniable that the 
Umbrella Movement was aware of, and in many ways, relied on, the ambiguous, international 
“urban” and the equally enigmatic institutions of capitalism. Architect and theorist Keller 
Easterling has created the term “extrastatecraft” to describe the power of global capitalist 
networks through urban infrastructure, particularly in free-trade zones. She describes Hong Kong 
as one of the most “highly-prized zone models” to global business and its elusive partner, the 
state, who relies on economy to “camouflage” its own infrastructural endeavors.22 Her 
assessment of infrastructure “disposition” is most valuable to my analysis because it prioritizes 
the city’s “active form” over its “object form”.23 This is precisely how I believe Lefebvre’s 
definition of the right to the city is still applicable to the modern city. Infrastructure may have 
global origins representing ambiguous, contemporary institutions of power, but the disposition of 
the city concerns the elemental relationship between people and urban space. Easterling explains 
disposition as “a tendency, activity, faculty, or property in either being or objects”.24 My analysis 
is from the perspective of the protesters: a group of Hong Kong idealists who see urban 
infrastructure as potential. The post-Umbrella Movement mindset, too, can be described as a 
cognitive form of disposition because, as Easterling phrases it, the protests represent a change in 
the city’s “chemistry of the soil”.25 Disposition includes the interstitial space of the urban plan 
being a tool of democracy. These ideas mimic French Situationist Michel de Certeau’s famous 
                                                 
22 Easterling, Extrastatecraft. 69, 17. 
23 Ibid. 21, 72, 92. 
24 Ibid. 72. 
25 Ibid. 214. 
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1980 essay on walking through a city. He describes walking as either a decided act of 
compliance or of dissent, which emphasizes the tremendous role of the citizen’s perception in 
determining the power of a city’s infrastructure.  In dissent, the common perception of urban 
space is challenged, so Certeau’s ideas become increasingly relevant. 
 My bottom-up approach does not focus only on the geography, infrastructure and 
architecture of the capitalists and the state, but more-so on the subversive, dispositional weapons 
wielded by the protesters. It challenges the meta-narrative of many modern-day Marxist 
geographers and relies most heavily on Lefebvre’s original concept by prioritizing the physical 
form of the city over the vast theoretical notion of “the urban”.This is because I am looking at 
the spaces as the protesters, local Hongkongers, do. All of their efforts go against Merrifield and 
Castells’ assertion that the city is no longer a viable entity. My thesis is, at its heart, entirely 
about subversion: the counter-production of space that, to citizens, only exists at the street level 
within Hong Kong’s urban design. Hongkongers’ actions during these protests were a 
proclamation that the city of Hong Kong still exists to them as a single entity with its own 
distinct cultural and political landscape, not as merely a focal point within a figurative urban 
fabric. In focusing on the form of the city, Lefebvre uses the idea of transduction to describe the 
nuanced relationship between theory and form. The emotions of theory and the reality of urban 
infrastructure ebb and flow, gradually manifesting into urban form, rather than all at once 
producing an urban utopia. Similarly, Marxist’s total revolution is a theoretical concept only. The 
Umbrella Movement is not a total revolution, but an urban, physical demonstration of the 
theories of protest “transducting” within Hongkongers’ city. It is not about empirical data, like 
Harvey believes, or really even about a global urban population, like Castells believes. To 
Hongkongers, their injustices are about the space of Hong Kong and their feelings towards it: 
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their sense of place, sense of culture, sense of independence, and sense of control. The protests 
were a wholly emotional proclamation that these sensations still exist and stand in defiance of 
the perception of Hong Kong by mainland China and the global capitalist class as simply an 
economic engine and mechanism of globalization. 
 The city-state of Hong Kong is an ideal city for such analysis because it has such a 
dominant urban identity. In the Occupy Movement, for example, the city acted as representative 
of the majority, but in Hong Kong, the city is who the protesters are and exactly what they are 
fighting for. Hong Kong has the best metro in the world and ninety-nine percent of citizens own 
public transportation passes, which has emphasized the city center as Hong Kong’s economic 
and cultural core.26 The dominant industries of banking, business/professional service, and trade 
make up nearly forty percent of all Hongkonger’s jobs, all of which rely on the urban center and 
its harbor.27 As the Umbrella Movement progressed, the protesters’ anxiety of assimilation by 
mainland China emerged as a dominant motif. The Goliath that is mainland China and its 
enormous urban expanse threatened to absorb Hong Kong’s vital position within the global 
economy, while ignoring its cultural and historic autonomy. Demands for universal suffrage, 
access to honest education, and freedom of exploitation by the government and business 
synthesized as an overwhelming appeal to protect the essence of Hong Kong. The ideology of 
the right to the city became represented in form - in architecture, in infrastructure and in public 
space. Virtual networks, theories and ideas of revolution cannot result in change without these 
forms because these forms are reality. The actions upon, within and around the urban form are 
the result of the idea of the right to the city, and consequently also the facilitator of it.  
                                                 
26 Wong, “The World’s Most Envied Metro System.” 
27 HK Census and Statistics Dept., “2011 Hong Kong Population Census.” 
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 My research focuses on the Hongkongers’ counter-methods of production created by 
citizens during this time of protest to undermine these institutions within the existing urban 
space. With their demonstrations, particularly the occupations, protesters flipped the 
authoritative context of these spaces on their heads and took control of the space. The research 
methods I have adopted mimic the perspective of these protesters by looking at the spaces not 
solely as a prison contrived of capitalist power. The protesters have shown the potential of the 
spaces in-between, above and below the infrastructure of the powerful as well as the resounding 
hope public space offers. In observing the strategies of the “networks that are”, I am revealing a 
far more compelling, even hopeful narrative of Hong Kong and its future. The protesters’ actions 
imply that subversion of space can overpower the production of space. Marxist theorists might 
argue that the Umbrella Movement failed because it did not achieve total revolution, but a more 
dynamic understanding of the Umbrella Movement proves this to be untrue. Marxists focus on 
capitalist injustices and then on proletariat revolution, but inadequately examine what happens in 
between. The protesters’ subversions of space represent developments in their perspective of 
urban space and their authority figures. The space is not just a foundation for oppressive 
architecture, it is their home and every interstitial space between, below, and around these 
buildings is still a space that has the potential to represent their right to the city. The Umbrella 
Movement may not be representative of the Marxist utopia where the ruling capitalist is 
overthrown by the working proletariat, but it is the cumulative clamor of a society revealing their 
social aspirations and defining their identity not with the institutions of the powerful few, but the 
decisions of the collective “we” within, and upon, the urban environment.  
 15 
2.0  CAUGHT IN THE WEB: THE GEOGRAPHIES OF PROTEST 
Woven into the saga of Hong Kong’s birth all the way to the Umbrella Movement is a dominant 
theme of political control.  The Umbrella Movement began as fight for control of Hong Kong’s 
right to self-govern and ultimately catalyzed the strongest illustration of a united Hong Kong 
populace in history. On September 22nd, the demonstration in Admiralty became violent when 
the police rained teargas onto the protesters. Almost instantaneously, the other two protest sites, 
Mong Kok and Causeway Bay were born. The specific locations of these sites were organic 
developments with sincere and revealing implications. All three sites were a direct product of 
geographic circumstances, including the historical, cultural, and political contexts of the districts 
within the city-state. Powerful historical connotations stood in contrast with the others, but by 
asserting control of the three sites equivalently, protesters proved to their audience in Beijing and 
to the rest of the world that they stood together as a single, unified force. Protesters used the 
geography of these sites as a three-pronged net within which they captured the city they had 
declared their right to. Initially, it may seem that geographic barriers to vehicular traffic would 
be the protesters’ most dangerous weapon.  However, it was the geographic emotional 
declaration of unity that would send the most powerful message to Beijing and have the greatest 
political impact and residual effects on the city. 
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2.1 HONG KONG’S HISTORICAL IDENTITY 
In 1842, the island of Hong Kong was handed over to the British as part of the Treaty of 
Nanking, concluding the Opium Wars. In 1860, British control was expanded to the Kowloon 
Peninsula, then into the New Territories in 1898. Hong Kong is not yet 175 years old, yet it has a 
present-day population over seven million and incredible international significance culturally, 
through technology, food and art, and economically, especially as one of the world’s most 
successful free-trade megalopolises.28 Hong Kong as a geopolitical marvel represents a global 
shift in the history of colonization from a statement of imperialism to an act of globalization.  
The influx of international businesses, languages and cultures cultivated a quasi-culture 
characterized by Ackbar Abbas as a “city of transients.”29 However in 1984, the signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration Act promised the return of the city-state to China in 1997 as a 
Special Administrative Region (SAR). This act fostered a budding sense of identity among 
Hongkongers as they increasingly began to understand their city not as an appendage of the 
British Empire, but as having its own political identity.30 Politics has a profound significance on 
the identity of any space, but Abbas’ theory that the signing of this single act could so greatly 
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affect their perception of identity helps us understand the weight Hongkongers currently place on 
political autonomy. 
 Even though it was not fully embraced by the Hong Kong populace for so long, Hong 
Kong developed an exceptional culture wholly unique to its 1,070 square kilometers. Not only 
did it develop under the influences of both British and Chinese culture, but the influence of a 
very distinctive topography. On the Southern edge, Hong Kong Island runs into steep mountain 
range, and on the other side, it is almost immediately barricaded by the Pacific Ocean. These 
factors and cultural influences resulted in an innovative, vertically-oriented urban design to 
house one of the most diverse populations in Asia. Then, just five years after the signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration Act, the deplorable, violent events at Tiananmen Square made 
China’s contempt of the ideals of democracy abundantly clear and raised concerns whether Hong 
Kong would ever receive their promised political autonomy under an authoritative Chinese 
Communist party in Beijing and preserve their newfound sense of identity. When Wark 
described modern citizens as identifying with temporary terminals, rather than origins, Hong 
Kong is a city whose globally-influenced and connected citizens could have previously been 
characterized as the epitome of this idea due in part to their historically Western influence. 
However I believe the perceived threats of Beijing’s authority reasserted Hongkongers’ attention 
to their origins, the Hong Kong city, and consequently, on the border between Hong Kong and 
mainland China. These events greatly influenced Hongkongers during a time when they were 
establishing what it means to be from Hong Kong, pushing their identity in a decidedly un-
Chinese direction.  
 18 
2.2 BORDERS 
The specific boundaries of Hong Kong were originally defined by British naval officers and 
cartographers. Actually, their ability to survey land and create a geographic image of a space 
played an integral role in their success expanding the British Empire into the East.31 These 
borders have immortalized British influence within Hong Kong because, even today, colonial 
demarcations define who is a Hongkonger and who is not. On the 28th of September, 2014, 
when the protests began in Admiralty, Hongkongers were forced to consider their identity and 
their allegiances, subconsciously bringing these borders to the forefront of every citizen’s mind. 
 
                Figure 3. The geography of Hong Kong,, map by author 
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 However, the colony of Hong Kong was founded upon a doctrine of division. The British 
acquired Hong Kong as a tactic for British merchants to monopolize Asian trade, including 
avoiding discriminatory Chinese laws, including the denial of any foreign women in China.32 
Once in control, intense discrimination was instituted on the non-European citizens of Hong 
Kong, like having to obtain night passes when out past 10PM.33 This division between colonial 
powers and the native citizens became easily embodied in the city-state’s geography with the 
very literal division of the Kowloon Peninsula and Victoria Island by the Pacific Ocean (see 
Figure 3). At the time of acquisition, the inhabited population of Kowloon was approximately 
3,000 fishermen and farmers, but when migrant worker population exploded, the colonial 
government felt increased pressure to distance themselves from the Chinese population.34 A 
“paranoia of invasion” towards both the prospect of a physical invasion by Chinese troops and a 
potential cultural invasion brought by these migrant citizens, became a commanding mentality in 
early British environmental planning.35 In 1877, colonial authorities went as far as to reserve 
most of Hong Kong Island (then called Victoria Island) for Europeans only.36 However, this 
emerged as more of an economic exclusion than a racial one. An influx of Chinese migrant 
workers, necessary for the colonial economy, was directed to the Kowloon Peninsula and a 
settlement on the Western coast of the island, but wealthy Chinese found loopholes allowing 
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them to live on the hallowed Victoria Peak and within the region now called Central.37 In 
response, colonial authorities began using architecture to assert cultural control of these spaces. 
In Kowloon, the Chinese shop-house was the dominant typology.38 This tenement-style housing 
usually had four floors (tall for the time) and was informally designed to accommodate shops 
and warehouses on the first floor.  The density of these spaces and lack of services provided by 
the colonial government perpetuated racial stigmas that Asians were unorganized and unclean, 
justifying British prejudices that depicted the Chinese as a potential threat to the health of 
European women and children.39 On Victoria Island, Britain’s firm sense of authority manifested 
as neo-classical architecture, which dominated the landscape. These buildings effectively 
perpetuated British culture and social behavior.40 In British artistic depictions of the city of 
Victoria, emphasis is often placed on monumental, classic buildings, with only small details, like 
lingering groups of Chinese onlookers or mountains fading into the background, to suggest the 
Asian geography.  These classical forms were symbols of liberty to the British Empire, which 
was surely a source of irony to the oppressed ethnically Chinese population. The British saw 
Hong Kong foremost as a geographic tool of economic freedom from Chinese-imposed tariffs, 
spawning the contemporary perception of Hong Kong as Western culture’s portal to the East. 
Although these architectural styles are almost non-existent in Hong Kong today, the remnants of 
this mindset have come to define the city’s plan. 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 245. 
38 Shelton, Karakjewicz, and Kvan, The Making of Hong Kong. 44. 
39 Bremmer and Lung, “Spaces of Exclusion.” 244. 
40 Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and Politics of Disappearance. 78. 
 21 
The protest sites of Admiralty and Causeway Bay are on both on Hong Kong Island, 
which remained segregated and inaccessible to the Chinese until 1946.41 Admiralty has perhaps 
the most clear historical allusions to British colonization of any Asian region. As late as 1997 it 
had held one of Britain’s most significant and enduring navy stations, called the HMS Tamar.42 
Now, in a dramatic reversal, it has become home to Beijing’s governmental representation, the 
Central Government Complex. The Beijing-based Chinese government visually reclaimed this 
space shortly after the handover with an iconic building whose arched shape acts as a window 
between the shore and Hong Kong’s primary financial district. However, the name of the space 
under the structure, Tamar Park, connotes the historical legacy of Britain’s colonization. 
2.3 HONG KONG ISLAND 
As British neo-classical forms subsided, the architecture of Hong Kong came to represent 
economic prosperity.43 The skyscraper fulfills a contemporary interpretation of these goals, 
while also addressing problems with overcrowding. Within Hong Kong today, there are 558 
skyscrapers, nearly 200 more than New York City.44 Similar to colonists’ attempts to control the 
culture of the island with neo-classical architecture, the megastructures of Hong Kong Island, 
built by wealthy financiers and many Chinese companies, represent Hong Kong’s role in the 
global capitalist economy, as well as dictate the the uses of the space and consequently, 
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influences who maintains the right to the city. Marxist geographers see this as an obvious 
example of capitalists’ production of space advancing their own agenda until the space is almost 
entirely devoid of the presence of a local culture, as Sharon Zukin calls it, “the market eroding 
place.”45 As the financial region of the third largest international financial city behind New York 
and London, the abundance of global leaves no room for the local.46 The tall buildings, with the 
exception of the Central Government Complex and a few others, are a monotonous series of 
towers (See Image 1). The streets lack the trademark density of other areas of Hong Kong due to 
a “second ground” of platforms and footbridges that encompass the entire Admiralty region and 
distance people from vehicular traffic at street level.47 Admiralty thus offers a shiny and 
sanitized rendition of the urban Hong Kong experience. I.M. Pei’s Bank of China Tower in 
Admiralty and Norman Foster’s Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
building in nearby Central represent the role of Chinese businesses in the development of high-
profile mega-architecture. The beauty of these buildings and their international prestige acts as a 
faux culture, particularly to international visitors, and suffocates other aspects of authentic Hong 
Kong culture around them.  
Admiralty was established by a foreign, colonial government and transferred to another 
non-local authority, China. It acts as the epicenter of international political influence upon Hong 
Kong and as such has never truly belonged to Hongkongers. The protest site here came to most 
represent the concern that Hong Kong was turning into “just another Chinese city”, meaning a 
city more concerned with financial prowess and global perceptions of power than the well being 
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of its citizens.48 The impressive, gleaming buildings towered over the protest space as proof of 
their concerns. The concept of the “right to the city” takes on a different meaning in Admiralty 
because of its historical context. Hongkongers were boldly declaring a right to a space they had 
never truly had much influence upon before. In many ways, the protesters’ occupation of 
Harcourt Road, the primary road of Hong Kong Island between these massive, international 
buildings, can be perceived as the first declaration of authentic Hong Kong culture in the 
Admiralty district. 
 Causeway Bay lies to the East of Admiralty along this same primary road, though it 
changes names from Harcourt Road to Hennessy Road between the two. The first form of public 
transportation, established in 1903, was a tram running this same route from Kennedy Town 
through Central and Admiralty and then to Causeway Bay, eventually extending all the way to 
Shau Kei Wan.49 From Admiralty, extending the protests East sent a much stronger message 
because in early colonial Hong Kong, Sheung Wan, on the West coast near Kennedy Town, had 
been the only location on the island where the local Hong Kong population had been permitted to 
settle and build in their own architectural style.50 Hence, that area has developed into a small 
enclave for Hong Kong’s people and culture. Instead, by establishing a presence to the East, the 
protesters were furthering their invasion into areas more dismissive of Hong Kong’s own sense 
of culture, and therefore, also less hospitable for them as protesters. 
 Although Causeway Bay had once been a busy fishing region, it is now an extremely 
upscale retail district. Like many globalized, highly capitalist regions, East Asian societies have 
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generally associated economic freedom with civil liberty; the correlation became so direct that 
when civilians' democratic rights were threatened by the events in Tiananmen Square, the 
tragedy prompted a surge in consumerism- a phenomenon that was dubbed “doom and boom” 
economy.51 Yet more recently, perhaps in part due to the rhetoric of the Occupy movement in the 
United States, the Hong Kong population began to recognize that their consumerism actually 
profited the upper class, therefore increasing the influence of the wealthy elite.52 The Causeway 
Bay site was the natural site to denounce this influence, in part, because it is central to an area 
that has experienced extensive gentrification that has slowly pushed local Hong Kong culture 
out. An example is the street Lan Kwai Fong, just South of the Causeway Bay protest site. A 
unique aspect of Hong Kong’s urban design was the development of small “ladder-streets” 
extending North and South off of the primary East-West axis.53 As previously mentioned, Hong 
Kong’s topography turns into a steep incline as it gets further from the harbor and closer to a line 
of fifteen mountains including the most famous, Victoria Peak. These ladder-streets were 
developed as pedestrian markets rather than as transit due to their short, steep design.54 One of 
the steepest, Lan Kwai Fong, provided refuge from busy East-West traffic, so developed into a 
bustling, mixed-use neighborhood with shops and residences.55 When an increased emphasis on 
native culture developed in the 1970’s, this district emerged as the epitome of the vernacular, 
urban street typology. However, soon after, this increased attention attracted capitalists, 
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triggering destructive gentrification. Today, Lan Kwai Fong is the premier nightlife district 
among tourists and visiting businessmen, but is usually avoided by local Hongkongers. What 
seemed at first a promising model of Hong Kong culture turned out to simply be another 
example of capital suffocating sense of place. 
2.4 MONG KOK 
 
                  Figure 4. The regions previously inhabited by British military, map by author 
In 1880, the East-West axis of Hong Kong was connected to the Kowloon Peninsula by the 
inauguration of the Star Ferry.56 At this time the Southern point of the peninsula, Tsim Sha Tsui, 
and the area directly North of it, Yau Ma Tai, were British military districts, so the local Chinese 
population was pushed further North into the region of Mong Kok, the Umbrella Movement’s 
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third protest site (see Figure 4).57 Mong Kok developed into an “old vibrant and partly seedy” 
mixed-use neighborhood.58 Despite the British military leaving long ago, residual effects of their 
occupation are evident in Mong Kok’s development as a sub-par living environment. For 
example, despite architectural similarities with Tsim Sha Tsui, Mong Kok now has far inferior 
air quality due to reduced air flow caused by its distance from the harbor and general disregard 
by urban planners.59 
In stark contrast to the expansive malls of Admiralty and Causeway Bay, Mong Kok is 
famous for its street markets, a cultural remnant of the Chinese shop-house’s influence. With 
pedestrian flows sometimes exceeding 4,000 per hour, every turn is teeming with Hong Kong 
culture and people.60 Several street blocks exceed population densities of 775,000 people per 
square mile, making it one of the densest regions in the world.61 To deal with this density, Mong 
Kok employs another architectural allusion to the traditional shop-house: stacking. It might be 
the only place in the world where one can find high-rise horse stables, multi-story cemeteries, 
and an abundance of roof-level schools and churches.62 As density inevitably increases, the 
locals find ways to cope, using the streets for their markets, intersections as their public squares, 
and alleys for refuge from the rest of it. Géraldine Borio and Caroline Wüthrich of Parallel Lab 
emphasize the importance of interstitial spaces as “edge public spaces … providing breathing 
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room” to the congestion of Hong Kong’s day to day.63 Very thin, secondary streets in Mong Kok 
provide just enough room for lively markets to emerge specializing in ladies clothing, flowers, 
and even pet goldfish. Alleyways no wider than four or five feet provide students and workers 
invaluable relief from the incessant activity of the streets for a snack or a cigarette. Other small 
public spaces are woven into the urban fabric in the forms of rooftop sports centers and “pocket 
parks.”64  
 
                           Figure 5. Langham Place in Mong Kok, diagram by author 
 However, as density reaches beyond what many presumed possible, “island mentality” 
seeps into the urban design of Mong Kok- a region historically defined by its contrast to Hong 
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Kong Island.65 Langham Place, a fifty-nine story multi-purpose building, including a fifteen 
story shopping mall, was built at the heart of Mong Kok in 1999.66 It is integrated into Mong 
Kok’s metro station, a fundamental transportation hub connecting most of Kowloon Peninsula to 
the New Territories. It took five years to build, and the resulting structure was outrageously short 
of the specifications outlined by the Metro Plan published September 1991, only providing eight 
of the mandated nineteen required hectares of open space.67 This plan was designed to provide 
for the diverse populations of Mong Kok, but as of 2014, Mong Kok is still missing a multitude 
of key features including twenty-six social centers, three youth centers and a total eighteen post-
offices.68 Instead, Langham Place is adorned with outdoor escalators and footbridges, making it a 
new, expansive pedestrian tier to the region. This system may seem pragmatic, but broad 
alterations to the sensitive composition of the day-to-day activities threatens Jane Jacob’s notion 
of the “ballet of the sidewalk” and its “complex order” derived from the many layers of the 
everyday.69 It removes pedestrians from the life and markets of the street below, instead 
diverting them through a network of internationally-owned commercial centers. The tall, shiny 
tower of Langham Place is what archaeologist John Costonis describes as an architectural 
“alien”, reminiscent of Hong Kong Island’s commercialism and capitalist expansion (see Figure 
5). Surrounded by the comforting “icons” of the region, like the markets and historic Old 
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Kowloon Police Station, this alien threatens the very identity of Mong Kok.70 To the citizens of 
Hong Kong, it has become a built symbol for inevitable encroachment of the Chinese 
authoritarian regime, who many fear to be worse even than that of the British Empire. 
Within the geography of the Umbrella Movement, Mong Kok represents Hong Kong’s 
most local and marginalized citizens.  Compared to its partners on Hong Kong Island, Mong Kok 
has far less international influence and therefore, far less of an international audience. Admiralty 
was victim to the first and most famous act of violence by the police, the tear gas on September 
28th, but Mong Kok experienced by far the most police brutality. At one point during the 
struggle for Nathan Road, the primary axis of the Kowloon Peninsula, the intersection at 
Shantung Street became a recognized battleground between police and protesters. The protesters 
were very loyal to their leaders who urged them to remain peaceful, so were unarmed and only 
had minimal defenses, such as goggles, helmets, and make-shift armor made of miscellaneous 
foam pieces.71 However, riot police were armed with CL liquid, a new weapon similar to tear gas 
that was given to them specifically for the protests, and batons, which they used aggressively 
against unarmed citizens.72  Mong Kok is stereotyped as a home to many thugs and gangs. The 
government has been accused of extorting this reputation by hiring many of these thugs to do 
what they could not, that is blatantly abuse protesters.73 This allowed the government to incite 
added violence on the protesters with minimal responsibility, but more importantly, it implied 
that there was fragmentation among the protesters. The government needed to discredit the Mong 
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Kok protesters as representatives of the Hong Kong majority because that would weaken the 
Umbrella Movement as a whole. While the architecture of Causeway Bay and Admiralty act as 
Hong Kong’s global facade, Mong Kok threatened Beijing because it added a third, localized 
dimension to the protest that authenticated the Umbrella Movement as representative of the 
whole of Hong Kong. 
2.5 A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE SHIFT  
The shift of balance is obvious geographically (see Figure 6). While Causeway Bay and 
Admiralty sit in relatively close proximity to one another on the primary axis of Hong Kong 
Island, running East-West, Mong Kok is across the harbor on Kowloon Peninsula. The protest 
was primarily on Nathan Road, the dominant axis of the peninsula running North-South. It did 
expand at the Argyle St. intersection, though, until it occupied the area beneath Langham 
Place.74 Most of the streets of Mong Kok are dominated by pedestrians and therefore not 
automobile-friendly, but the protesters did not choose those streets. Instead, they interrupted the 
rampant traffic flow of Nathan Road, blocking thousands of drivers coming from the New 
Territories from accessing the ferries at the peninsula’s end, and therefore Hong Kong Island.75 
Meanwhile, the metro below Mong Kok, one of the core stations of the extremely successful and 
popular MTR system, was mostly unaffected. Their occupation attacked the transit of the mostly 
upper class who owned and relied on cars, without effecting the average citizen, demonstrating 
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that they too deserved, and were capable of asserting, control of these primary roads. The MTR 
also permitted potential sympathizers of the Umbrella Movement easy access to and from the 
site.  Bringing these public roads back to their original intent, transportation for the wealthy, was 
most likely the primary pragmatic reason for the police’s aggression and urgency in clearing the 
Mong Kok occupation. However, it was the threat of a unified Hong Kong population was the 
unspoken, true fear of Chinese authorities and the police.  
                                                                               
   Figure 6. The axes of Hong Kong and the three protest sites within Hong Kong’s geography, maps by author 
 Looking at the geography of the whole of urban Hong Kong, the occupation of Mong 
Kok shifted the scale of the protest from a relatively small focal point within Hong Kong Island 
to a three-pronged web encompassing Hong Kong’s urban boundaries. The figurative center of 
Hong Kong may be perceived by global elites and Beijing authorities as somewhere within Hong 
Kong Island, but the third site of Mong Kok illustrated that to the Hong Kong people, the 
symbolic center of Hong Kong lies somewhere between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula. These sites can never be divorced of their history, so the protesters flipped the 
meaning of spaces’ divisive historical contexts so that they would represent unity. They utilized 
the assumption of their division along geographic and socio-economic lines to emphasize this 
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contemporary proclamation of unity. Only the geography of the city-state could provide this 
platform. As the protests took root at these three sites, the geography of Hong Kong became 
ensnared in their web of protest. Transportation was hindered because cars could not travel past 
three massive blockades on Hong Kong’s two primary axes. But more importantly, no matter 
where you were within Hong Kong, you were not far from one of the three protest sites. The 
geographic implications of these three specific sites combined to produce a message unique to 
the city at this place in this time. The protesters’ strategy encompassed the historical, cultural and 
geographic significances of the spaces under their unifying message of democracy and hope. 
Cumulatively, these spaces caught Hong Kong within the protesters’ web, and suggested that 
perhaps their right to the city could not be escaped, either. 
 33 
3.0  LOOK AT ME NOW: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIENCE AND 
SPACE 
Shortly after the French Revolution, historian Jules Michelet said this about the protest spaces of 
Paris: 
 The Champ de Mars! (English: “Mars Field”) This is the only monument that the   
 Revolution has left. The Empire has its Column, and engrosses almost exclusively the  
 Arch of Triumph; royalty has its Louvre, its Hospital of Invalids; the feudal church of the 
 twelfth century is still enthroned at Notre Dame: nay, the very Romans have their   
 Imperial Ruins, the Thermae of the Caesars! 
  And the Revolution has for her monument: empty space.76 
Hong Kong’s unique urban composition offers exceptionally limited public space, particularly 
that free from the inherently biased design of architecture. To cope with the growing demand for 
these spaces, urban designers developed a complicated vertical labyrinth of footbridges and 
walkways that has caused some to refer to Hong Kong as the “city without ground.”77  However, 
protesters did not choose these elevated spaces to exercise their rights; instead, they occupied the 
ground. By appropriating the spaces in-between, they were laying claim to the land they felt a 
right to and reinventing the urban plan as what Henri Lefebvre termed “social space.”78 The 
consequences of this transformation added pressure to the already strained public areas. These 
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limitations became the primary catalyst of the Umbrella Movement, mobilizing police into an 
offensive position. Thereupon, the spaces became a symbol of the citizens’ oppression and a 
device that revealed the rights which were truly at stake. Looking at the protest spaces at the 
level of the district, it seems the spaces have been chosen because they each represent a specific, 
oppressive audience. The images created with these protests in these specific places used 
powerful imagery to establish a clear dichotomy of masses versus oppressors. The existing 
architecture of Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok provided a symbol for the latter and an 
audience for their proclamations. The spaces between became a stage upon which the citizens 
enacted their right to the city. Hence, reactions to their presence and the events upon this 
architectural stage became a drama substantiating the protesters’ concerns.  
 
                             Figure 7. View from the stage in Tamar Park, photo by author 
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3.1 ADMIRALTY’S AUDIENCE 
In Admiralty, the protesters made their chosen audience abundantly clear when they stood on a 
small stage in Tamar Park under the arched, looming Central Government Complex building. 
Facing the Chief Executive’s Office, the Legislative Council, and the Central Government’s 
West Wing Offices, the architecture provided a portal to Beijing the protesters could speak to 
(see Figure 7). The buildings’ sizes dwarfed the protesters, but the central location of Tamar Park 
provided spatial leverage. Protesters demanded attention from leaders in Beijing and their 
representatives within Hong Kong, and when they felt as though this target was not being 
reached, they followed their audience. A week after the initial gathering, protesters walked to CY 
Leung’s home to address him there.79 As discussed in the introduction, they returned to find the 
space taken over by a competing, pro-China rally. The first group of protesters moved to the 
Eastern side of the Central Government Complex, occupying Tim Mei Avenue. In thinking about 
their audience, this side has the primary entrance to the complex as well as the Civic Square. 
Without Tamar Park, there was no public gathering space for them to congregate. The Civic 
Square had been closed to protesters and the public for an extensive amount of time.80 After 
breaking down the large fence between the road and the Square, they had their first true 
occupation space. The Civic Square is very near to the building’s entrance, to provide a constant 
reminder of their devotion, and it has a roof to protect occupiers from the elements (see Figure 
8). Their signs pleaded to the government, “we only want universal suffrage, we only want civil 
nomination; this is not a revolution” and “we all love HK, please don’t hurt me.” Others took a 
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more threatening tone: “dear government, we are watching you.”81 Long after the Umbrella 
Movement’s conclusion, this sidewalk to the East is the only space in Admiralty where tents and 
signs lingered for months more because it affronted the protest’s primary adversary, government 
officials, most directly.  
 
    Figure 8. The Civic Square under part of the Central Government Complex, photo by author 
When the government worried that the protesters would spill into Hennessy Road, it 
resulted in the Movement’s first major altercation: on the 8th of December, 2014, 87 canisters of 
tear gas were released onto the protesters of Admiralty.82 Almost immediately, the protests in 
Causeway Bay and Mong Kok erupted, and Admiralty’s occupation spread into the eight-lane 
highway, Hennessy Road. This allowed for many new viewpoints from which to witness the 
protest site, including two high-traffic footbridges connecting the Central Government Complex 
with Admiralty Center, a shopping mall and the financial district’s most significant 
transportation hubs across the highway. The protesters in this area closest to the center appealed 
to citizens taking the metro and buses by advocating peace and demonstrating a growing sense of 
community. The signs read “violence free”, “you’ll never walk alone” and asked “shall we 
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talk?”83 Government officials and bank executives in the buildings around this protest site were 
forced to visually encounter these protesters and read their grievances, while citizens exiting the 
MTR were given a community with whom they could question their authorities and exercise 
their rights. This exemplifies some of Merrifield’s theories of urban space, which discuss the 
imperative relationship between space and encounter in allowing “affinity to take hold”.84 
3.2 THE ROLE OF IMAGE 
Image was critical to the protesters and they were fighting an uphill battle against the 
government’s influence in the media. Hong Kong has very little “small press” and larger media 
outlets were wary of covering stories of rebellious young people opposing the powerful Chinese 
Communist government.85 Like Tahrir Square and the Occupy Movement before them, 
protesters relied on social media to spread their message, but they had to be very careful what 
message it was. They sought a careful balance between reaching two audiences: their oppressors, 
whom they wished to aggravate, and non-protesting citizens, whom they wished to welcome.  In 
order to attract the latter and maintain a positive reputation in international media, they had to 
appear peaceful and in control, but also as victims of an unjust regime. The occupied space 
utilized a trope of visuality to emphasize the symbolism of their space and promote their cause. 
By occupying these spaces, they employed the same metaphor that Occupy Wall Street and the 
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Arab Spring had before them, which suggested that these spaces had been preoccupied by their 
oppressors.86 Using this pregnant environment as a backdrop for their created communities, they 
contrived the architectural antithesis of the districts’ reputation. The neighborhoods of tents that 
emerged in late September stood in stark visual contrast with the looming, cold buildings of the 
Central Government Complex, the gargantuan vertical shopping malls of Causeway Bay and 
even the complicated infrastructure of Mong Kok. Their disarray and make-shift style alludes to 
a refugee encampment, comparing their struggle to a larger image of the world’s 
disenfranchised.87 However, the art and the vibrant life within these make-shift neighborhoods 
shifted their connotations to something positive. They ask viewers, are these monumental 
capitalist structures the representatives of economic freedom, or, instead, are these shabby, self-
made communities the truest example of liberty and societal success? Protesters helped 
journalists document the protests, even protecting them during dangerous events while they 
uploaded their work online.88 Many of the images documented the horrendous police brutality in 
response to the protesters’ occupation, like journalist FX Pasquier’s photos of protesters washing 
teargas from their eyes (see Figure 9). They knew these images worked in their favor, and that 
getting them to an international audience would put more pressure on the government and also 
attract more protesters.  
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                 Figure 9. Protester and victim of the polices’ teargas. Photo credit: FX Pasquier. 
Beyond journalists and “small press”, livestream cameras documented and broadcast the 
protest in real-time, allowing an international audience to interpret the events and the space 
independently.89 When police barricaded student leaders Alex Chow and Lester Shum, treating 
them in a way one protester described as “like dogs”, this was seen by Hongkongers and others 
across the world.90 The virtual audience was not “unanchored in locality” as MacKenzie Wark 
described, but, I believe, a wholeheartedly local connection made possible by virtual 
geography.91 Highly circulated photos of families making small donations to the protest sites, 
middle-aged citizens holding signs vowing to protect the younger generation, and students 
dripping in tear gas fostered a sympathetic image of the locals to reach the global audience. 
Some Hongkongers living internationally came back to join the movement, while others donated 
time and personal effort to translate social media into seventeen different languages.92 To garner 
sympathy, the protesters needed to be understood, so they used Tumblr, Twitter, Facebook and 
                                                 
89 Anonymous, The Umbrella Movement: Social Media and Public Space in Hong Kong. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Wark, Virtual Geography. 
92 Anonymous. 
 40 
other social media groups to spread their images and accompanying ideas. Realizing “a picture 
speaks a thousand words” and ability of images to be hyper-circulated, the signs throughout the 
site were in Mandarin, Cantonese, English, German and even Hindi.93 Although these spaces 
were not the result of social media, this newfound tool enacted a multiplier-effect on the 
audience of these environments. 
3.3 CAPITALISM AND CAUSEWAY BAY 
Hong Kong’s smallest protest site, Causeway Bay, addressed a different architectural audience: 
the oligopolies derived from the limited supply and high demand of real estate. Causeway Bay is 
the most expensive retail rental space in Asia and second only to Upper Fifth Avenue in New 
York globally. In fact, three of the five most expensive retail districts in the world are on Hong 
Kong Island.94 Between 2009 and 2011, Hong Kong’s property prices surged 76%, propelled 
mostly by very low interest rates and foreign demand.95 It is important to remember that in Hong 
Kong’s economy the government holds the leases on all the land of Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon.96 This means that land value is captured and divided among only two groups: the 
government and developers. This is a singular example of Hong Kong’s renown for unbridled 
capitalism - it has led the world’s economic free-trade ranking for the past twenty-one years.97 
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This makes the Hong Kong market extremely attractive to foreign investment. Meanwhile, the 
distribution gap in family income, referred to as Gini Index, sits at a staggering 53.7 -- the 
twelfth highest in the world and the highest among developed nations.98 While the combined 
wealth of Hong Kong’s ten richest people is over $140 billion, nearly a fifth of Honk Kong’s 
residents live below the poverty line.99 It also ranks as the country where so-called crony-
capitalists are most likely to succeed, with nearly 60% of GDP being accredited to billionaire 
wealth in crony sectors.100  This is nearly triple that of the second worst-scoring country, 
Russia.101 Hong Kong, it seems, has developed an oligopoly led by a small class of real-estate 
tycoons. The government is frequently accused of colluding with the financial elites while 
neglecting the needs of the masses, so these tycoons are viewed as an extension of Admiralty’s 
government officials, just as the Causeway Bay protest is an extension of the events within the 
Admiralty district.  
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                                     Figure 10. Times Square intersection in Causeway Bay, photo by author 
Causeway Bay’s outrageous rent, wealthy lessees and blurred status between public and 
private control offers a prime audience for the marginalized lower classes. It was expected that 
Hongkongers would engage with this space as consumers, which would intensify the gap 
between rich and poor. Instead, they inhabited them as residents, thereby asserting control of the 
land and its meaning. The space became accessible to all as a space of residence, rather than only 
those who can afford to patronize the expensive surrounding stores.   
 The protesters situated themselves in the most central space, the intersection of Hennessy 
Road, Jardine’s Bazaar and E. Point Rd, called “Times Square” (see Figure 10). Perhaps the 
most iconic store there is SOGO, a Japanese department store currently owned by Hongkongers 
Joseph and Thomas Lau of Chinese Estates Holdings. Joseph Lau is fifth richest man in Hong 
Kong and was charged with bribery of government officials in 2012.102 Adjacent to SOGO is 
Times Square, a shopping mall with a conspicuous allusion to the world’s foremost financial 
capital, New York City, owned by Wharf Holding Limited and Peter Woo - Hong Kong’s eighth 
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richest citizen.103 Wharf was accused of accepting $36 million in bribes from building 
contractors in 2004.104 The city’s third richest citizen, Cheng Yu-tung, is chairman of Chow Tai 
Fook, a high-end jewelry retailer.105 There are thirteen of his stores in the Causeway Bay area 
alone. In fact, seven of the ten richest Hongkongers made their fortunes in real estate and all ten 
can be connected to companies or land in Causeway Bay.106 This protest site aimed to discredit 
these businessmen as representatives of the Hong Kong populace. By inserting themselves, their 
modest lifestyles and their hand-made architecture at the feet of these buildings, the protesters 
made the distinction between themselves and these elite few undeniable. They demonstrated that 
they were not asking for anything monetary, but simply for civil liberty. 
 There are fourteen shopping malls, most of them very high-end, within the thirty-one 
square miles of Hong Kong Island. Two of these malls, Hysan Place and Times Square, face the 
Causeway Bay intersection of the protest. This area is often considered a public gathering place, 
despite its small size and high velocity of traffic. If you wished to gather or rest, a better place 
would be within a shopping center. When Times Square was built by Wharf Holdings Limited, 
they signed a Deed of Dedication guaranteeing over 32,000 square feet for public access, 
pedestrian passage and passive recreation; however, a lease to the Starbucks corporation in 2005 
and a controversy involving security guards evicting lingering pedestrians in 2008 have raised 
more questions on the legitimacy of Privately Owned Public Spaces (POPS).107 The increasing 
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control of public land owned by corporations acted as a spatial example of the masses’ lack of 
democratic rights, and therefore a spatial symbol for the cornucopia of consequential injustices.  
 
Figure 11. Diagram depicting views of the Causeway Bay protest site from the surrounding skyscrapers. 
Diagram by author. (See Image 7 from a view from point “A”.) 
The height of the Causeway Bay buildings and their close proximity creates an almost 
claustrophobic atmosphere along the streets. Large, attention-grabbing signs cantilever over the 
space, overwhelming the protesters’ homemade signs with their size, bright colors and legibility. 
However, the protesters utilized their position within the site- the middle of the street- to outdo 
the corporate displays. They were central, unexpected, intrusive and surrounded by the 
commotion of engaged protesters. If walking towards the protest site from the metro, the first 
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visible signs labeled their protest “The Umbrella Revolution” and “Occupy Hong Kong”, 
immediately expressing solidarity with the original Admiralty protest and employing the rhetoric 
of the international protests before it. These signs were at a scale legible to approaching citizens, 
corporate workers and consumers shopping in the surrounding skyscrapers. The monumental 
buildings created a vertical auditorium for protesters’ demonstration, filled with their target 
audience (See Figure 11). Large windows from SOGO and Times Square have an unobstructed 
view of the site, with little else distracting their vista due to other tall buildings adjacent to them 
(see Figure 12). At the most central space, between the entrances to SOGO and Times Square, 
the protesters situated their podium. 108 Speakers such as Chu Yiu-ming, a prominent social 
activist, spoke to followers, but also addressed the stores and those entering them directly with 
their words and focal position.109 By using the space to commandeer the perspective of the 
powerful, they ensured that their message could not be ignored.  
 
Figure 12. Point A on Figure 11. View of the former Causeway Bay protest site from a nearby shopping mall, 
 photo by author. 
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 Intermingled within the protest were many smaller signs in English, Mandarin and 
Cantonese commanding action from other citizens. From the perspective of the sidewalk, 
proximity made these larger than the banners and billboards above them. Some read “fight for 
justice” or “pray for democracy.”110 Their audience was those walking by the protests, urging 
them to choose their fight as opposed to aiding their nemesis by contributing to their profits. The 
occupiers did not impede upon the sidewalks, permitting audience of non-protesting citizens that 
would ebb and flow with the day. It is also worth noting that the space, when not occupied, is 
primarily pedestrian. Gigantic crosswalks cover the intersection and yet people casually cross 
areas at other points of the street not meant for pedestrians. The occupiers had many breaks in 
the barriers around their site, allowing for these natural passageways to continue, just through 
their accommodated spaces.111 If the communities lured someone in, the tents, artwork and 
information would dominate eye level, obstructing the buildings around them.  For those not 
brave enough to enter the occupied sites, an unoccupied area of the protest site sat at the Eastern 
length of Hennessy road.112 It was not open to traffic due to the protesters’ barricades with large 
signs labelling the space part of the “Umbrella Revolution”, but the space was wholly accessible 
to those walking along the sidewalk. The only structures in the space were a modest democracy 
classroom and accompanying library. They only used three small tents between SOGO and the 
most recently opened mall, Hysan Place, but they invited curious pedestrians a less intimidating 
opportunity to learn about the protesters’ cause. The other democracy classroom was 
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strategically situated nearest to the metro-station, along the axes between it and the attention-
grabbing podium. 
3.4 SPACE AS TESTAMENT 
Stronger than the protesters’ pragmatic use of the space, though, is the symbolic use. As the 
protests progressed, all three spaces escalated into battlegrounds between the protesters and their 
oppressors. Hong Kong has only approximately 1.5 meters of public space per citizen, less than 
almost any other city in the world, granting enormous weight to sidewalks and street corners.113 
To the capitalist juggernauts of Causeway Bay, these public spaces, when used by the public in 
an act of dissent, represent the limits of their power - a chink in their armor. Similarly in 
Admiralty, the government had hoped that by excluding protesters from Tamar Park, they would 
silence them. Violence came when the protesters occupied the sidewalks, streets and footbridges, 
effectively circumnavigating the supposed control of the government and the wealthy. The 
aggressive and violent backlash to their position became a testament of their injustice. As 
protesters steadily aggravated authority through spatial interventions, the resultant abuse became 
a subsequent catalyst for other citizens to join their fight. The police’s intervention took the 
protesters’ symbolic position and escalated into an even more symbolically significant battle. 
Losing this space became representative of losing hope of democracy. When the 87 canisters of 
tear gas were released upon the Admiralty protesters, they did not retreat or move to another 
space; instead, protesters repeatedly entered the zone, only leaving the space periodically to wash 
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their eyes.114 Losing that specific, charged space was admitting defeat, and they would rather be 
assaulted with tear gas and bludgeoned by police than relocate. 
Months after the protest’s conclusion, remnant demonstrations in Causeway Bay continue 
to occupy spaces between the sidewalk and the street. Their methods mimic those of the original 
protest. Large, doctored photos of a horned and fanged CY Leung send a clear message at a 
distance, taunting the tall buildings surrounding them, while smaller flyers attempt to educate 
passersby. To many, the names of these districts have now become synonymous with the 
ideologies of the protests. At the very least, these protests have created a clear connection 
between the Hong Kong citizens’ injustices and the elite patrons of the surrounding buildings. 
The protests were an accusation and a powerful reaffirmation of the Hong Kong citizens’ right to 
the city. 
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4.0  AN ARCHITECTURAL BATTLEFRONT: STRATEGIES OF SPATIAL 
SUBVERSION 
On any given day during the Umbrella Movement, the protesters’ encampments in Admiralty, 
Causeway Bay or Mong Kok were pleasant and lively communities. Between their colorful 
shelters, the Hong Kong people had created a small community with art, classrooms, vegetable 
gardens, and even their own source of electrical power.115 The protesters living there did not 
appear as enraged hoodlums, but as peaceful idealists. Occupation as a form of protest said more 
than any act of revolutionary violence could because it was a simple, powerful act of counter-
occupation upon the very land the protesters felt a right to. In the first chapter, I discussed 
Langham Place as an architectural alien threatening the many delicate layers composing Mong 
Kok’s urban vernacular. The protesters’ initial occupation of Admiralty is inherently an act of 
reverse aggression. Like Newton’s third law, the protests were an equal and opposite reaction to 
Beijing’s political and economic invasion of Hong Kong. To counter the power of the capitalists, 
they garnered the power of the mass collective. This chapter looks at the protests at the scale of 
the street to analyze specific strategies of subversion upon the urban design and infrastructure of 
Hong Kong’s urban space. The protesters were peaceful and respected private property; they did 
not inhabit the malls, the banks or the homes of their oppressors. Instead, they asserted their right 
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to the city upon public space, which they had the greatest, undeniable right to. When their 
presence prompted various forms of state-sponsored police brutality, it proved the necessity of 
their actions and upped the proverbial ante. From then on, every act within the space and upon its 
infrastructure, no matter how seemingly inconsequential, must be interpreted as a meaningful act 
of dissent. 
Marxist geographers like David Harvey hinge their theories upon the social production of 
spaces and their ultimate role as a coliseum for revolution. Yet, to understand the Umbrella 
Movement, it is far more appropriate to perceive these as spaces of gentle, clever subversion. 
Karl Marx theorized that production determines consumption, promoting an economic system 
ultimately exploitative to the marginalized proletariat.116 Marxist geographers took this a step 
further by applying theories of production directly to urban space through policy and 
infrastructure, espousing Henri Lefebvre’s “right to the city”.  Hong Kong’s profound limitation 
of land and unique government structure has exaggerated these circumstances because not only 
capitalists, but the government benefits from monopolistic rent.117  This, combined with Abbas’s 
description of Hong Kong as a “cultural desert” until the 1970’s, created a sort of Catch-22 for 
the Hong Kong people in which any suggestion of cultural worth was easily exploited within an 
urban system.118 
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4.1 THE PROTESTS AS A REACTION  
 
 
                        Figure 13. Admiralty’s iconic skyline, photo and diagram by author 
The protesters’ occupations were an assertion of Hong Kong’s local identity as a reaction to two 
enormous, external threats: mainland China and global capitalists. Both influences are reflected 
in Hong Kong’s urban branding, a concept derived by David Harvey. Urban branding describes 
the capitalist initiative to increase the economic value of urban space by increasing its appeal to a 
global audience. However, urban branding can be extremely destructive because it usually entails 
the manipulation of heritage, history and aesthetics.119 This is most evident in the island’s mega-
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skyline of Chinese or internationally owned businesses residing in buildings designed by 
international starchitects (see Figure 13).  The other, more recent force adding stress to Hong 
Kong’s infant cultural identity is the cultural giant that is mainland China. An authoritative, 
communist government and overwhelming population size has created an assembly line of 
brand-new megacities. In 2013, the Chinese government announced plans to relocate 250 million 
rural residents into urban regions.120 A new urban character, the ‘ghost city’, has emerged to 
describe urban centers built in anticipation of a population, so sit empty until the residents move 
in. The population of Hong Kong is David versus China’s Goliath. When protesters express their 
concerns at becoming just another Chinese city, it is because they recognize their global identity 
and the ease with which it may be exploited. Upon the land that China gave to the British Empire 
in 1842 sits an entirely modern city with massive economic appeal. It is third on the ladder of 
international connectedness and has earned a reputation as the ‘Gateway to the East.” 121 While a 
colony of Britain, Hong Kong may have lacked a strong sense of personal identity, but had a 
unique geography and therefore a unique role within the British Empire and considerable cultural 
independence. China’s evolution towards a national culmination of monotonous urban centers 
threatens to absorb Hong Kong, exploiting its international prominence while simultaneously 
distorting many of the very characteristics that created it. China, therefore, is represented by 
more than just the Central Government Complex, but by urbanization as a whole. Most 
architecture in Hong Kong, like the previously mentioned Langham Place or HSBC Building, 
can somehow be interpreted as a symbol of oppression, so only a movement that does not rely on 
this architecture could adequately represent an opposition to China.  
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Even though Hong Kong is almost entirely composed of urban dwellers, the occupations 
of the Umbrella Movement allowed protesters to interpret this characteristic of their culture not 
as a reliance on tall buildings, but rather as an intimacy with one another and their urban 
environments. The small tents sat in close proximity to one another, while interstitial spaces 
became communal living areas or storage.122 Like a city, their hand-crafted architecture dictated 
the movement of civilians around it and through it. However, their shelters and gardens were not 
permanent enough to protect them from the police, who wanted the sites to move. Then, it 
became a battle of infrastructure. Protesters designed barricades to protect their space on the 
streets. All three sites had these barriers, which were made of shipping containers, zip-ties, and 
other found materials. They were so dense and well-constructed that authorities had to use 
bulldozers when removing them.123 
4.2 BARRIERS 
The streets could no longer accommodate cars due to the occupation sites, but cars became part of the 
protesters’ spatial strategies nonetheless. It is unclear whether these cars were driven to the spaces by 
protesters or abandoned by people trying to drive through, but the protesters used some idle cars under the 
footbridges of Admiralty to ensure that small area could be a stronger blockade. On the footbridges, they 
also made sure to crowd the space so that government employees had difficulty reaching the Central 
Government Complex.124 Similarly, in Mong Kok, the protesters used empty cars to reinforce the borders 
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of their occupation. Seven buses and many privately-owned vehicles became engulfed by protesters 
during the initial protest and were deserted.125 One of the abandoned busses was nicknamed Bus N689, a 
reference to the number of votes that put CY Leung into office.126 
Barriers became a theme that permeated the Umbrella Movement at many scales. These 
barricades became its climax, but even the protest sites’ earliest and most docile days paid 
special attention to built and perceived boundaries. On October 22, after being ignored for three 
weeks in Tamar Park, a group of the student protesters marched to CY Leung’s home. Once 
there, they stood outside his estate’s tall, metal fence.127 Security watched them nervously and 
insisted they stay away from the fence, but the students calmly ignored the police as they tied 
yellow ribbons to its posts. In Hong Kong, yellow ribbons have historically symbolized women’s 
suffrage, so protesters were symbolically enclosing CY Leung’s home within ribbons of 
democracy. When the protesters returned to Admiralty, the space had become occupied by a pro-
China rally, so the original protesters shifted their attention towards the Eastern edge and 
consequently, its boundaries. A tall fence blocked civilians from accessing the “Civic Square”, 
so as the protest’s first act of aggression, it was torn down.128 As their anger escalated, the 
protesters ignored implied barriers, like the sidewalk’s edge, as well. The protests spilled into the 
streets. Short cement walls bordering the Southern side of the highway were easily overcome 
with the help of the protest’s tallest, strongest men and later with handmade stairs.129 At one 
point, police attempted to corral protesters within temporary metal fencing, but in one of the 
                                                 
125 Wen, “The Hong Kong Bus Stops Here.” 
126 Parallel Lab, “Mong Kok.” 
127 Tse, Riots, Unrest, and the Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong Rising. 
128Tse, Riots, Unrest, and the Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong Rising. 
129 Pasquier, Admiralty and the Umbrella Movement. 
 55 
most clever examples of manipulation, the protesters brought zip-ties and reassembled the metal 
barricades to protect themselves from the police (see Figure 14).130 The tents themselves acted as 
protective barriers, providing shelter and comfort in the midst of a combat zone. Actually, the 
symbol of the entire movement, the umbrella, became so when civilians used it as a protective 
barrier between themselves and the police’s tear gas. The protesters’ created barriers were 
powerful weapons, but their subversion of existing barriers advanced the metaphor that would 
mobilize Hong Kong by demonstrating to other citizens that they could exercise control over 
their public space, despite the government’s intentions.  
 
               Figure 14. Protesters zip-tying temporary fencing together in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: FX Pasquier 
The Admiralty protest site is the most dynamic example of the protesters’ constructed 
barriers (see Figure 15). Protesters encircled their occupation site with their barricades, 
protecting themselves and blocking traffic. When authorities wanted to move protesters away 
from the Central Government Complex, these barriers ensured the demonstrators could stay in 
place. This is important because this part of Harcourt Road is very important for the protesters to 
reach their intended audience: the government officials. Also, the protest site was easily 
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accessible by the Admiralty MTR station on the Southern edge, so it was important they remain 
in front of it so that additional protesters could join as they please. As the movement expanded, 
the protesters did not move the existing barriers; they simply constructed more along various 
points of Harcourt Road.  
 
Figure 15. Diagram of the Admiralty protest site emphasizing the barriers constructed by the protesters, diagram by 
author. (MTR indicates the metro station.) 
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4.3 SPATIAL TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 
The problem with analyzing the Umbrella Movement from the Marxist geographer’s perspective 
is that it focuses so much on the finality of revolution that it overlooks the powers of subversion. 
Hong Kong citizens’ initial efforts were never asking for total independence from mainland 
China; they were simply asking for political autonomy in the form of promised democratic 
elections. Although the economy and urban structure of Hong Kong reflect many Marxist 
concerns, the protest’s catalyst was call for political integrity and for citizen participation, not a 
revolution. Hongkongers are famously pragmatic, having been appeased through negotiation and 
compromise in the past.131 However, Communist China proved to be a very different authority 
figure than the British Empire, with more to lose and a far more heavy-handed approach.132 The 
police’s reaction speaks volumes to the power of these new leaders, as the police were mostly 
composed of Hongkongers themselves who incited unprecedented brutality against their fellow 
citizens. As discussed in chapter two, these spaces were meant as a stage upon which the 
protesters could testify to injustices. The student demonstration in Tamar Park that began in 
September 2014 was peaceful and relatively small. Student leaders and professors such as Bruce 
Lui Ping Kuen urged mass mobilization at risk of potentially becoming “slaves forever”, yet it 
was the government ignoring the protests entirely that finally persuaded larger groups to join.133 
The rest of the saga of the Umbrella Movement is a cyclical repetition of this pattern: an act that 
either insulted the protesters or physically harmed them, followed by the protesters invading a 
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new space or subverting existing protest spaces in new ways, repeated again and again. The 
production of these spaces, while certainly relevant, tells us more about a small, elite group of 
Hong Kong capitalists and less about the character of the Hong Kong populace. However, the 
protesters’ creative consumption of the space, which ultimately intensified into their counter-
production of space in this time of protest, reveals much more about the Hong Kong majority.  
 
Figure 16. Umbrella Movement leader giving a speech while using the footbridges of Admiralty as a mezzanine, 
2014. Photo credit: FX Pasquier 
Michel de Certeau’s influential work The Practice of Everyday Life delineates a 
distinction between “strategies” and “tactics”, the former being a tool of spatial production and 
the latter a manipulation conceived in spatial consumption. For example, the placement of 
sidewalks is a strategy of the powerful, yet where citizens ultimately walk is the tactic which 
tells us more about their society. Marxist geographers focus on the precursors of a revolution, so 
look primarily at strategies, but I believe the inherent power of tactics has the potential to 
outmaneuver them. The Umbrella Movement protesters controlled the sites by using the existing 
infrastructure in new ways to their benefit. For example, the two footbridges over Harcourt Road 
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connecting the transport hub to the Central Government Complex were walkways for 
government workers — spatial elements that benefit the powerful — but the protesters set up 
their encampments beneath them and used the bridges as platforms for their message. Early on, 
they became an auditorium for protesters to listen to speeches of the protest’s leaders from below 
(see Figure 16). They became covered in a collage of multi-lingual signs; the largest were 
proclamations aimed at government authorities, but also served to embolden the crowds (see 
Figure 17). Two famous ones read “Your Arrogance Keeps Us Here, Solidarity Will See Us 
Through” and “You May Say I’m A Dreamer, But I’m Not The Only One.”134 These footbridges 
were blocked at points early in the protest when authorities were trying to prevent civilians from 
joining demonstrations on the other side of Harcourt Road. This, along with the tear gas, 
triggered the occupation of Harcourt Road, so these footbridges were seen, in many ways, as 
conquered land. Hong Kong’s verticality, discussed in chapter two, is a defining characteristic of 
the city, but many of these vertical labyrinths are private structures built as part of malls or office 
buildings.135 There are nearly 700 footbridges in Hong Kong, but the Admiralty site was beneath 
three of the most significant.136 Controlling these bridges meant controlling access to Tamar 
Park, so obstructing accessibility to the protest sites was an attack on the protesters freedom to 
space and access — fundamental urban resources. When the protesters took to the streets, they 
reclaimed control of access to the government complex. They never tried to destroy the 
footbridges, just translate their implications to a language that portrayed the masses. The 
protesters changed the basis of the footbridges’ power from accessibility to visibility. In chapter 
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two, I discussed the trope of visuality and the importance of highly-circulated images of the 
occupation. These bridges allowed a large, elevated platform for their voices, as well as a 
mezzanine from which to soak in the occupation’s grandeur. By covering the infrastructure of 
their oppressors with messages of resilience and unity, they flipped the very meaning of this 
environment upside down.  
 
Figure 17. Footbridges in Admiralty decorated in banners, 2014. Photo credit: Wing1990hk 
As the protests continued, the significance of these spaces evolved further from symbolic 
geographic apparati of democratic access towards conspicuous indicators of the protesters’ 
omnipresence. As their purpose transformed, authority’s response did too. Certeau’s definition of 
the powerful’s spatial strategies of control had been overcome, so the powerful’s representatives, 
the police, had to resort to spatial tactics in hopes of regaining control of the architecture’s 
context. The police tried to tear down the signs and maintain that the bridges remain free from 
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occupation, but that only made them a prime space for altercations, which was exaggerated when 
the confined spaces did not allow people to disperse easily.137 
 Nearer to the end of the protests, the police mimicked some of the protesters’ strategies. 
For example, they used the footbridges as vocal platforms to taunt the protesters, shouting at 
them from above.138  Once the protests had concluded, tactical approaches subsided and the 
government seems to have resorted to strategic methods to prevent future problems. In April 
2015, a new footbridge was being constructed to connect an existing footbridge directly to an 
entrance of the Central Government Complex (see Figure 18). Above the final lingering tents on 
the sidewalk outside the Civic Square, this new construction ensures that any activities on Tim 
Mei Avenue, the site of the protest before it expanded into Harcourt Road, will not prevent 
government employees from accessing the complex’s office buildings.  
 
Figure 18. Recently constructed footbridge in Admiralty. Summer, 2015, photo by author. 
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So like the protest’s occupation of these spaces caused the police to rely on spatial tactics, 
the control the occupations granted the protesters allowed them to evolve their spatial tactics into 
their own spatial strategies. Again, Certeau defines strategies as methods of production by the 
powerful.139 Similarly, Marxist geographers look at urban space as a product of the bourgeoise. 
The power of the occupations stems from a bold, new perspective of public space that recognizes 
it as an opportunity for the proletariat. The infrastructure and policies suggest these roads are 
meant for automobiles, which are only owned by less than five percent of Hong Kong 
civilians.140 Therefore these restrictions, informal or formal,  are infringements upon public 
space’s responsibility to serve the whole. This public space had fallen victim to the office 
buildings bordering Harcourt Road and the classical British architecture before them; therefore, 
it had become another device bolstering the bourgeoisie.  Without destruction and without 
violence, the protesters created their own infrastructure as the antithesis of the typical 
environmental cooperation with the bourgeoisie’s agenda.  The occupations were obviously not 
comfortable or pragmatic for the daily lives of Hong Kong’s average civilian, but by subverting 
this agenda, not using it as a site of transit but as a site of inhabitation, they recreated this public 
space so that it could be used by any resident of Hong Kong. It’s as David Harvey said, the right 
to the city needs to be created, not preserved.141 
 The public land brought Hongkongers together, creating a unifying platform for them to 
“demonstrate what cannot be dictated”.142  The motif of occupation demonstrates a space’s 
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ability to “pre-date any modern connotation”.143 Tamar Park turned out to only have a facade of 
true public space, and most “public” areas in Hong Kong are privately owned (POPS), so the 
protesters resorted to the streets for truly public refuge. Instead of adhering to the contemporary 
demands of the space as vehicular transportation, the protesters redefined the streets as true 
public squares and then, as neighborhoods. Social media allowed Hongkongers to weave 
themselves into a larger network of civil disobedience and a universal idea of modern, true 
democracy.144 Like the urban branding of Hong Kong created by the capitalists, the Umbrella 
Movement used the blueprint laid out by Occupy and the Arab Spring to create its anti-brand. 
The images of the occupation revealed an uncensored, jarring view of the Hong Kong people 
juxtaposed by the sanitized, lustrous urban backdrop, completing the vision of the Umbrella 
Movement (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19. Harcourt Road in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung 
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 The protesters’ mimicking of Occupy Wall Street exemplifies McKenzie Wark’s concept 
of virtual geographies providing “theatrical promptings” for life to imitate. These were 
demonstrations at the nth degree because the self-organized, utopian communities provide an 
element of proof that they can function without, and despite, the government. They became more 
of a community because anyone could join them at any point in the day. The protests began on 
July 1st, Hong Kong’s annual holiday celebrating, essentially, their ability to protest, so many 
assumed they would fizzle out once the work week resumed.145  However, the occupations 
provided a home, a study-space and a place to relax for students and employees after-hours, so 
the contrived spaces themselves ensured the Movement lasted far longer than government 
officials had expected. 
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4.4 MONUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 
 
Figure 20. The Umbrella Man in Admiralty, 2015. Photo credit: Citobun 
The virtual geographies of cyberspace encouraged highly visual spaces that could transcend 
language barriers. Visual allusions to other protests further nestled the movement within the 
universal dogma of civil liberty. The most startling was a ten foot tall statue of a man standing 
erect and holding out an umbrella, inviting Hongkongers to stand beneath it (see Figure 20).146  It 
was made by an anonymous artist and seems a clear reference to the 10 meter tall statue created 
by Tiananmen Square protesters in the 1980’s called the Goddess of Democracy. The atrocities 
of Tiananmen Square are not spoken of in Mainland China, where protests have since been 
outlawed. Vigils for the victims of Tiananmen have been pushed so far from Beijing that they are 
currently held annually in Victoria Park in Hong Kong, near Causeway Bay. The implications of 
the Umbrella Man threatened Beijing authorities because it reminded them that in Hong Kong, 
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they had not forgotten what happened at Tiananmen Square and were continuing their fight for 
democracy.  
At the base of the Central Government Complex, the protesters covered a wall in colorful 
sticky notes and messages describing the significance of democracy to them. It is known as 
Admiralty’s Lennon Wall, referencing famous activist musician John Lennon and a similar wall 
in the Czech Republic. The covered wall is no longer recognizable as the foundation of CY 
Leung’s offices. Communally, the protesters hijacked the architecture of their oppressors to 
create a shrine of democracy.  
 
Figure 21. Protesters using umbrellas as shields from the police and later, tear gas, 2014. Photo credit: FX Pasquier 
The symbol of the umbrella became ubiquitous with the movement shortly after the first 
instance of tear gas and its use as a shield (see Figure 21). In Hong Kong, umbrellas are used 
daily by common people as protection from sporadic rain showers and the harsh sun of the 
tropical climate. They represent the proletariat because they are an everyday tool for those who 
walk outside and use public transit. In branding their movement, the umbrella was an essential 
icon of solidarity as the movement spread to the other sites (see Figure 22). They used them as a 
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medium to create large installations, including an interesting quilt of umbrellas hanging between 
two footbridges in Admiralty (see Figure 23).  Months after the protest’s conclusion, images of 
yellow umbrellas linger throughout the city in the form of stickers, apparel and signs. At a small 
student march in Causeway Bay the following May, I saw citizens join the group as they passed, 
expressing their solidarity by simply opening and raising their umbrellas over their head as they 
walked (see Figure 24). The appropriation of this every day, highly necessary object symbolized 
a universal need for democracy. Like the protest sites, the umbrella’s cultural connotation is 
forever altered in Hong Kong. 
 
Figure 22. Umbrella art in Causeway Bay, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung 
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Figure 23. Umbrella art in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Pasu Au Yeung. 
 
Figure 24. March in Causeway Bay, Summer 2015, photo by author. 
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 In the capitalists’ branding of the city, the skyscrapers of Hong Kong are monuments to 
progress. The skyline is an international representation of economic freedom and the global 
financial market, not the culture of Hong Kong’s people. However, Certeau believed that the city 
needed to be interpreted by looking at the way people use it, not its monuments or even its 
architecture. The man walking through Causeway Bay on October 2014 was not looking at the 
tall buildings, but the commotion of the protesters’ community at his eye level. John Quincy 
Adams once said “Democracy has no monuments. It strikes no medals; it bears the head of no 
man upon its coin; its very essence is iconoclastic.”147 The pieces of art intermingled within the 
protest sites, made by anonymous citizens or the community as a whole, undermine the capitalist 
monuments surrounding them, as do the tents, the classrooms and the vegetable gardens. The 
icons of democracy are not monuments at all, but the umbrella of the everyman. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION: REMNANTS 
On November 25, 2014, just two days short of the movement’s two month anniversary, the tents, 
barricades and artwork of the Mong Kok occupation were cleared. A handful of protesters were 
arrested and the site was emptied of all physical remnants. Three days later, protesters organized 
a march along Nathan Road through the emptied protest space fraught with its most recent 
memories. Thousands walked together chanting “gau-wu”,  dubbing the event their “shopping 
spree”. As law-abiding citizens they crowded the sidewalks, paralyzed the commercial district, 
and stripped the innocence from the physical act of shopping. Primarily, it was a response to CY 
Leung’s recent, tone-deaf request for Hongkongers to support their city-state by going shopping. 
Perpetuating notions that Hong Kong’s culture revolves around its economy, he had insulted 
protesters by regarding them primarily as consumers, all while continuing to ignore their 
demands as citizens. Secondly, it was a reference to a TV interview with a woman marching at a 
pro-Beijing rally a few months before. When asked what she was marching for, she said “gau-
wu”, meaning “shopping”, confirming many Hongkongers’ suspicions that most pro-Beijing 
protesters were actors hired by the government. The most overt reference, though, was the 
protesters’ simple chant. In Mandarin, the language of Beijing, “gau-wu” means “shopping”, but 
in Cantonese, the language of Hong Kong, it means “cock”. 
The Arab Spring and Occupy provided a blueprint for negotiating dissent in urban spaces. 
Social media perpetuated a philosophy of activism, strengthening the ideology of protest and 
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offering international support against unjust social regimes. However, as many student protesters 
proclaimed, history is easily ignored without proper, fair education and social media networks 
are useless under government censorship—the case in mainland China. Urban space is the only 
truly imperative factor of successful social movements. 
Geographically, Hong Kong’s protesters used urban space to symbolically reinforce their 
borders by unifying three historically and socioeconomically diverse districts within an 
overarching motif of community. Mong Kok, in particular, provided an especially local 
environment to represent Hong Kong’s most marginalized citizens. The efforts in Mong Kok 
added a component to the protesters’ right to the city that may have prevented the entire 
Umbrella Movement from being dismissed as merely an effort of radicals appropriating the land 
of the elite. Instead, it made plain that this effort was about establishing the whole of Hong Kong 
as their political geography and within their rights. 
At the scale of the district, urban space provided the voiceless with a podium. The 
protesters’ strategies manipulated the infrastructure of the elite into an arena within which to 
amplify the messages of the masses. Causeway Bay is the most obvious example, with its 
abundance of towers owned by capitalists situated upon land owned by the state. It forced their 
oppressors to watch and listen, even when they pretended not to hear. This strategy was two-fold 
because the protesters’ occupation of Causeway Bay’s extremely limited public space 
surrounding the architecture of its capitalists also impeded these capitalists’ power. The protest 
space created a boundary between the institutions of the capitalists, shopping malls, from their 
income, consumers’ pocketbooks, and thus furthered a compelling Marxist paradigm. 
Finally, at the street level, the specific spatial strategies of the protesters provided the 
most deliberate illustration of their perception of the city. They used urban space to create a 
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community and provide refuge for the marginalized. They built monuments to their ideas and 
neighborhoods that provided food, energy and education without reliance on the state. Then, the 
violent and merciless reaction of authorities to the citizens’ presence confirmed the perverse 
relationship between the citizens and their government, to an extent that even startled the most 
vehement activists. Where the citizens’ voices had been undermined by flawed elections, and 
pleas on social media had simply been ignored, it was Hong Kong’s urban space which finally 
revealed the extent of the government’s inhumanity. 
 Today, these spaces are black holes. Their gravity attracts an eternally dissatisfied, 
unrepresented majority. Democracy may be inherently iconoclastic, but the greatest monuments 
of the Umbrella Movement are the remnants of this empty space. Even when they seem free of 
the protesters themselves, the ideas of the Umbrella Movement fester. Admiralty especially has 
become synonymous with police brutality and government oppression, much like its ancestor, 
Tiananmen Square.  The following summer, a small group of tents linger silently under the 
Central Government Complex. No one verbally proclaims a thing and the signs are far more 
modest than their predecessors, but a small library offers citizens a sanctuary from ignorance, 
and gardens offer food for supporters and the homeless. In Causeway Bay and Mong Kok, 
groups of three or four activists sit on the sidewalks’ edges handing out pro-democracy literature 
and maintaining the images of the Umbrella Movement. Marches seem to occur weekly, usually 
departing from these charged sites, encouraging onlookers to raise their umbrellas and join. The 
lessons and ideas of spatial subversion have become integrated into Hong Kong’s growing 
protest culture. A persistent and clever group of activists continue to evolve these methods into 
mechanisms like the “shopping spree” in Mong Kok and the progression of the Umbrella 
Movement’s branding to include a new slogan “we’ll be back” (see Figure 25).  
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Figure 25. A daunting farewell from some protesters in Admiralty, 2014. Photo credit: Melanie Ko 
 Some experts have suggested we might finally see these ideas reflected in policy when 
the massive youth generation ages.148 Maybe, then, the Umbrella Movement is really just an 
early chapter in what Don Mitchell calls the “revolutionary urban process”.149 Where the 
Umbrella Movement began as a demand for fair universal suffrage, it evolved to recognize this 
civic violation merely as a component of far greater implications, all of which stem from 
infringements on their right to the city. 
Already in 2016, we have seen new protests picking up where the Umbrella Movement’s 
ideology left off.  On the hallowed streets of Mong Kok, protests have emerged more specifically 
expressing anxiety towards mainland China’s cultural assimilation. In MONTH 2016, the 
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Fishball Riots began as skirmishes between police and unlicensed street vendors, but quickly 
escalated into violent altercations involving large groups of citizens.150 These, along with other 
smaller protests and inevitable future ones, act as an echo of protesters prior on Admiralty’s 
streets asking “where has my dream city gone?”151 The series of events between September and 
December 2014 steeped the younger generation with an awareness that living as they had before 
is actually a demonstration of compliance with an oppressive system. Only because of the 
implications of urban space has Hong Kong culture grasped the extent to which they must not 
trust their authority and recognized their paramount responsibility to fight for their rights to the 
city of Hong Kong. 
As their umbrellas close, Hong Kong’s citizens still carry them at their side everyday. 
Most days, it offers protection from the rain and sun. But on other days, it will remind them of a 
recent past where it instead protected them from the tear gas and batons of their own 
government. Like the city, the umbrella is a tool to be subverted for the benefit of its holder. 
Today, the umbrellas of Hong Kong are closed, but given the chance of rain, they may be opened 
tomorrow. 
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